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I. INTRODUCTION
During the Depression era, it was difficult to find work. With a nation
in shambles, numerous Americans lost their jobs. Then, just as so many
began to lose hope, the Union Carbide Corporation decided to drill a tunnel
through Hawk's Nest Mountain in West Virginia, employing over 1,500
men to complete the project.' Men were overjoyed at the opportunity to
work so that they could feed their starving families. As the men began to
drill, many began to experience severe shortness of breath. They
acknowledged that the work environment was dusty, but their coughing and
difficulty breathing seemed quite extreme. As the project continued, more
and more men began to have trouble breathing, so much so that some
stopped breathing all together. Men were dying as they worked, and they
had no idea why.
The Union Carbide officials knew exactly why these men were dying.2
Hawk's Nest Mountain was composed almost entirely of silica, the most
common mineral in the earth's crust.3 When silica is ground into a fine dust,
as it would be when it is drilled, the dust becomes respirable.4 When silica
dust enters the lungs, nodules form and swell; as the swelling continues, it
becomes difficult and eventually impossible to breathe, causing death.5 The
swelling of the nodules is called silicosis and it was the cause of death for
over 700 of the men that the Union Carbide Corporation employed to drill
the tunnel through Hawk's Nest Mountain.6 These men were buried on the
side of the road next to the mountain in unmarked graves.7
The most appalling part of the Hawk Nest tragedy was the Union
Carbide officials knew of the great dangers that silica dust posed, yet did
nothing to stop the workers from being exposed to the dust.8 The men were
not given any protective materials to prevent inhalation of the silica
particles.9 This disaster shocked the nation.'0 In response to the devastation,
some reforms were made to help reduce the risk of contracting silicosis
1. Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, The Reawakening of National Concerns About Silicosis,
113 PUB. HEALTH REP. 302 (1998) [hereinafter Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening]; John M.
Black, Silicosis Still a Problem, 18 TEX. LAW. 35, 35 (2002).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health [hereinafter NOISH], NIOSH Issues
Nationwide Alert on Silicosis, at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/93-123.html (Nov. 18, 1992) (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005).
5. Id.
6. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1; Black, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.; GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DEADLY DUST: SILICOSIS AND THE POLITICS
OF OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 96 (Princeton University Press
1991) [hereinafter MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST].
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among workers, but it remains unknown whether these reforms have ever
been enough to prevent contraction of the disease completely.
Recently, two occupational disease experts, Gerald Markowitz and
Mark Rosner, traveled to the town of Picher, Oklahoma.' l  They
characterized the town as "a symbol of one of the worst public health
disasters of the Depression era." The entire town, even the children, had
some form of silicosis caused by the winds that blew silica particles from
piles containing thousands of tons of silica flint that had been mined years
before. 3 Prior to this visit, the experts had viewed the problems that
silicosis had caused as history, having deemed it a "disease of the past.'
14
"The medical community and the professional literature had virtually
stopped talking about [silicosis] by the late 1940's,"15 sometime after the
Hawk's Nest Disaster. But after visiting Picher, Markowitz and Rosner
realized that silicosis was still a problem affecting many Americans, and that
there were new epidemics of the disease affecting industrial workers all over
the country. 16 According to Markowitz and Rosner, "because silicosis was
hidden from public view, a national tragedy developed in which workers [in
foundries, shipyards, and mines] were assured that they were safe from harm
while many were [ ]being exposed and ultimately killed by exposure to silica
dust."' 7 By 1997, after the National Conference to Eliminate Silicosis and
many invitations to act as expert witnesses for plaintiffs who had contracted
silicosis, Markowitz and Rosner began to see a resurgence of the disease and
with that, of course, came litigation.
18
The most interesting part about the litigation that has increased because
of a resurgence of silicosis is the astounding amount of recent lawsuit
filings. "U.S. Silica, one of the nation's largest suppliers of industrial sand,
said its pending claims skyrocketed to 22,000 as of June 30[, 2003] from
3,505 [in 2002]."' 9 Different theories exist on why silica litigation has
experienced this sudden revitalization. One would assume that the litigation
is the result of more people contracting silicosis, as Markowitz and Rosner
posit. But some assert that the resurgence of silica lawsuit filings is not the
11. MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at xi.
12. Id.
13. Id. at xi-xii.
14. Id. at xiii.
15. Id.
16. Id. at xi.
17. Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, Social Policy and Social Movements: Corporate
Responsibility for Toxins, 584 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SC. 159, 169 (2002)
[hereinafter Markowitz & Rosner, Social Policy].
18. GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS OF
INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION xi (University of California Press 2002) [hereinafter MARKOWITZ &
ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL].
19. Susan Warren, Silicosis Suits Rise Like Dust: Lawyers in Asbestos Cases Target Many of the
Same Companies, WALL ST. J., Sept. 4, 2003, at B5.
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result of a silicosis medical crisis but rather the result of greedy plaintiffs'
attorneys using tactics developed in asbestos litigation to earn large
settlements from deep pocketed silica manufacturers and suppliers.2°
In a recent article, the Wall Street Journal suggested that the silica
litigation resurgence is so great that it could rival the volume and character
of asbestos litigation. 2' This hypothesis is supported by the fact that
"[a]sbestos attorneys are using the same legal machinery to generate silicosis
claims, relying on a huge network of chest X-ray screeners, medical experts
and local labor unions involved in asbestos litigation. 22 In the same article,
the author acknowledged that silica "[e]xposure rates in the workplace have
remained unsettlingly high. 23 Yet despite silica exposure rates being too
high, silicosis related deaths are decreasing.24 These conflicting facts force
one to question the reasons behind the sudden resurgence of silica lawsuit
filings. Is the increase in silica lawsuit filings due to unsafe working
conditions that have existed for years or due to plaintiffs' attorneys recent
efforts to capitalize on this old occupational disease? Could silica litigation
rival asbestos litigation? Is there a crisis in the workplace where employees
are being overexposed to deadly silica dust? Or, is the increase in lawsuit
filings simply asbestos attorneys using the same legal machinery to generate
silicosis claims in order to make a quick buck?
This comment examines the possible answers to those questions while
contemplating silica litigation and its potential to rival or surpass asbestos
litigation's volume and character. Part H summarizes silica litigation and
the history of silicosis from the first cases of the disease to the present. Part
III analyzes several courts' decisions in silica lawsuits and the affirmative
defenses that are relieving defendants of liability. Part IV briefly
summarizes asbestos litigation. Part V considers plaintiffs' and defense
attorneys' thoughts on the current state of silica litigation. Part VI compares
silica litigation to asbestos litigation and explores the reasons why the two
topics have recently been discussed together. Part VII concludes.
II. HISTORY OF SILICA LITIGATION
People are aware of the lung diseases that plague miners and asbestos
workers, but silicosis, an equally deadly occupational lung disease, remains
"virtually unknown. 25 Silica is the most abundant mineral in the earth's
surface, comprising ninety percent of the earth's crust. 26 The word silica is
actually a general term that refers to a variety of different minerals such as
20. See id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. NIOSH reported that in 1968 there were 1,157 silica related deaths. Id. In 1990, there
were 308 silica related deaths. Id. While in 1999, there were only 187. Id.
25. MARKOWiTZ & DAVID ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 3.
26. Black, supra note 1, at 35; MARKowlTz & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 4.
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quartz, sand, granite, cristobalite and tridymite.f Only when silica is found
in its crystalline form does it pose a threat to one's health.28
Silicosis is a disease that affects the lungs and is caused by the
inhalation of crystalline silica when it is ground down into fine dust
particles.29 Acute silicosis is the rarest and can cause death.3° It occurs
when workers are exposed to high levels of silica for short periods of time.3'
Classified as an occupational disease, silicosis typically affects workers
in "mining and quarrying; steel, iron and other metal foundries; abrasive
blasting; construction; glass and ceramics; paint and pigments; and crushing
stone. 32 Although silicosis typically only affects workers in certain trades,
it has been recognized as a "widespread hazard" by the National Institute of
Occupational Safety and Health ("NIOSH"), and exists as a huge threat to
the American workforce.33
When a person inhales silica particles, the particles become trapped
inside a person's lungs and swelling occurs. 34 Over time, the swelling
increases and nodules form on the lungs.35 As the swelling continues, it
becomes very difficult to breathe and eventually a person can die from
respiratory failure? 6 The disease is completely preventable, but once a
person contracts the disease, the only possible cure is a lung transplant, an
extremely expensive and dangerous procedure.37 Silicosis is irreversible and
27. Linda Regis, Comment, From the Sandbox to Sandblasting: Regulation of Crystalline Silica,
17 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 207,208 (1999); Black, supra note 1.
28. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 4.
29. Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, NIOSH Issues Nationwide Alert on
Silicosis, at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/93-123.html (Nov. 18, 1992) (last visited Apr. 2, 2005);
MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 3.
30. Regis, supra note 27, at 209 n.9.
31. Id.
32. Ingredients Might Be in Place to Make Silica the New Asbestos, BEST'S INSURANCE NEWS,
Sept. 10, 2003.
33. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 4.
34. Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, NIOSH Issues Nationwide Alert on
Silicosis, at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/93-123.html (Nov. 18, 1992) (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
Ordinarily, the lung and the nasal passages ... are able to sift, eliminate, and throw off
such foreign particles .... But inhalation of dust containing silica, while harmless as
long as these processes adequately function, results, if these fail, in nature isolating these
particles of silica by creating a tissue to wall them off.... The mere inhalation does not
necessarily cause injury. Rather the injury is the cumulative effect of successive
inhalations which cause such large amounts of silica to be deposited in the lungs as to
overcome their normal functioning.
Golden v. Lerch Bros., 281 N.W. 249,251 (Minn. 1938).
35. Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, NIOSH Issues Nationwide Alert on
Silicosis, at http://www.cdc.govlniosh/93-123.html (November 18, 1992) (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
36. Id.
37. Labor Secretary Calls for an End to Silicosis, American Lung Association, Mine Safety &
Health Administration, Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, Occupational Safety &
Health Administration, at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/newsrel.html (Oct. 31, 1996) (last visited Apr.
2, 2005); Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, NIOSH Issues Nationwide Alert on
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the symptoms of the disease, which include shortness of breath and
coughing, are ambiguous.38 Many doctors have mistakenly diagnosed
silicosis as other types of respiratory diseases, such as asthma or
bronchitis.39 It is controversial as to whether silica is a carcinogen, 4° but
silica was classified as a carcinogen by the International Agency for
Research on Cancer.4'
"Silicosis is one of civilization's oldest known occupational diseases,"
42
recognized as early as 460 B.C.E.. 4  In the Progressive era, working
Americans began uniting to confront the problems arising over the great
number of deaths and injuries occurring in heavy industry.44 Awareness of
silicosis grew with the industrial age.45 In the early 1900's, workers who
were employed cutting granite in Vermont began to notice that every one of
them was dying before the age of fifty.4 6 The union knew that the workers
were suffering from the inhalation of granite dust on the job and dying from
what would come to be known as silicosis.
47
Silicosis has been nationally recognized as a deadly disease since the
1930's. 48  Even before 1930, many knew of the serious hazards that
inhalation of silica dust caused. 49 But it was not until the 1930's that the
national press along with scientific and medical journals published articles
that recognized silicosis as a national problem that posed a threat to millions
of Americans working in dusty trades.5 ° Lawsuits began to be brought
against industry suppliers and employers.5 Relatives of workers who died
Silicosis, at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/93-123.html (Nov. 18, 1992) (last visited Apr. 2, 2005);
MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 4-5.
38. Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, NIOSH Issues Nationwide Alert on
Silicosis, at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/93-123.html (Nov. 18, 1992) (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
39. See Labor Secretary Calls for an End to Silicosis, American Lung Association, Mine Safety
& Health Administration, Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, Occupational Safety &
Health Administration, at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/newsrel.htm (Oct. 31, 1996) (last visited Apr.
2, 2005).
40. James M. Hughes, Silica Litigation From Both Sides of the Bar: Is Silica the Next Asbestos?
The Plaintiffs Perspective, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: SILICA, Dec. 2002, at 2.
41. Regis, supra note 27, at 207.
42. Thomas A. Gilligan, Jr., Silica Litigation From Both Sides of the Bar: Is Silica the Next
Asbestos? The Defendants' Perspective, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: SILICA, Jan. 2003, at 20.
43. Id. The disease was first recognized when Hippocrates saw a connection between the
inhalation of dust and a metal digger who was having trouble breathing properly. Id.
44. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 7.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 13.
47. Id.
48. Black, supra note 1.
49. In 1914, the Virginia General Assembly enacted a statute that compelled "foundries to
provide adequate ventilation for removal" of silica dust. See Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F.
Supp. 552, 562 (W.D. Va. 1984).
50. Black, supra note 1. "Throughout the 1930's, books, films, popular articles in magazines,
scores of reports in medical journals, and news articles in such weeklies as Business Week and
Newsweek proclaimed that the health of millions of Americans was threatened by this ever-present
substance." MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 4-5.
51. Black, supra note 1.
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on the job sued employers and received large settlements.52 The September
1933 issue of Business Week wrote about the "epidemic of lawsuits[] [that]
was 'giving serious concern to the construction, quarry, and mining
industries and to foundries and glass works."' 5 3
Insurance companies were affected by the many lawsuits being filed
because they were insuring foundries and other silica-using entities with
general comprehensive liability policies. 4 In 1933, the New York state
foundry industry was pummeled with over $30,000,000 in lawsuits." One
insurance attorney stated that "silicosis 'has all but paralyzed the [insurance]
industry in many cases.' 56 Still another insurance company claimed that
silicosis caused the greatest claims problem ever in the company's history. 7
As insurance companies saw more lawsuits, they began to terminate
coverage if companies would not fire those workers who had developed
silicosis. 5 8  Interestingly, one insurance company's head of claims
commented that "the problem was not that silicosis caused disability, but
that unemployment caused workers to use the legal system as a welfare
system and that unscrupulous lawyers were taking advantage of ignorant
workers." 59
In response to the great amount of litigation that was arising, insurance
companies began to lobby for silicosis to be recognized as a disease that was
compensable under workers' compensation statutes. 60  The workers'
compensation system was originally created to compensate employees who
had been injured in accidents. 61  But companies were trying to include
injuries like those caused by silica exposure within the coverage of these
statutes, as opposed to just injuries caused by accidents like slipping and
falling on the job.62 Lobbying was an effort to solve the great burden that
silica litigation was placing on the insurance industry and the work force.63
52. MARKOWrrZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 78.
53. Id. (citing Silicosis Menace, BUSINESS WEEK 19-20 (Sept. 1933)).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 81.
56. Id. at 79.
57. Id. ("Employers Mutual, a company that had a large industrial clientele, reported in its
twenty-fifth annual report to policyholders that silicosis suits resulted in 'the most serious claim
problem ever encountered.., in its entire history."').
58. Id. at 79-80.
59. Id. at 78-79. It is interesting to note that attorneys who represent insurance companies that
are facing numerous silicosis claims maintained the same attitude about silicosis lawsuits in 1932 as
they do in 2003. Both groups of attorneys believe that the extensive amount of silica litigation is
caused by plaintiff attorneys who are taking advantage of workers and their illnesses. Attorneys of
today and yesterday also believe that the results of this type of litigation will not be "justice for [the]
work force but rather the 'closing of industrial plants and a vast economic loss."' Id. at 79.
60. Black, supra note 1.
61. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 83.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 82 ("Since the Progressive Era, workers' compensation had proven extremely effective
989
Insurance companies found that the advantage in "covering silicosis through
workers' compensation was that administrative tribunals handled the
claims.... Workers' compensation removed contention over responsibility
for industrial disease from the public arena of the courts." 64 Also, workers'
compensation statutes limited the amount of possible recovery for silicosis
claims.
65
In the mid-1930's the Hawk's Nest Disaster brought silica to the
national forefront and caused the silicosis epidemic to be known as a
"national scandal. 66  The disaster occurred when the Union Carbide
Corporation employed 2,000 workers to drill a tunnel through Hawk's Nest
Mountain in Gauley Bridge, West Virginia.67 Although the mountain was
composed of pure silica, workers were sent to work without any protection
despite Union Carbide company officials' awareness of the dangers that the
unprotected drilling posed.68 Most, if not all, of the workers were exposed to
respirable silica, and 700 workers died while working on the project.69
Union Carbide buried the workers in unmarked graves on the side of the
road near the tunnel.70 Five hundred thirty-eight workers and their families
brought lawsuits against Union Carbide.7' The Hawk's Nest Disaster
solidified silicosis as a national problem. 72  "For more than twenty years
[prior] labor leaders, government officials and independent experts ha[d]
reported their findings on silicosis as the most widespread of occupational
diseases in America, but it remained for the... trail of death across the West
Virginia countryside to startle the nation to doing something about it."
73
In the early twentieth century, the great number of industrial accidents,
like the Hawk's Nest Disaster, sparked the interest of social reformers who
fought for compulsory health insurance and for the codification of workers'
compensation laws.74 In 1936, the Committee on Labor of the House of
Representatives met and authorized an investigation of occupational
disease.75 As a result, statutes were enacted around the country that made
silicosis compensable under workers' compensation statutes.76
in ameliorating the conflict between workers and management over disabling accidents that cost
workers their earning power as well as physical integrity.").
64. Id. at 83.
65. Id. ("IT]he average awards through the compensation system were dramatically lower than
under the liability system. The U.S. Commissioner of Labor Statistics estimated that the average
award in New York State for other occupational diseases only $325 in 1929.")
66. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1; MARKOwlrZ & ROSNER, DEADLY
DUST, supra note 10, at 96.
67. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1; Black, supra note 1.
68. Black, supra note 1.
69. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1; Black, supra note 1.
70. Id.
71. MARKOWlTZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 98.
72. Black, supra note 1.
73. MARKOWlTZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 98 (quoting Silicosis Prevention,
43 AMERICAN FEDERATIONIST 596 (June 1936)).
74. Id. at 5.
75. Id. at 96.
76. Black, supra note 1.
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In 1935, the annual American Foundrymen's Society meeting included
an extensive discussion of occupational health hazards.77 By that date, the
foundry industry had acknowledged that it was necessary to control workers'
exposure to silica because of the hazards the dust posed.78 Experts identified
the methods and sources of silica exposure and began to implement
programs that would control the dissemination of the particles.79 "IT]he
1936 [American Foundrymen's Society's] transactions, in their concise
chronology of the history of the foundry industry's knowledge of the
silicosis problem from 1871, point out that the dangers of silicosis had been
commonly known for some time prior to that date. 8°  Although the
American Foundrymen's Society recognized silicosis as a deadly disease in
1936, it was not until more than a decade later that the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged the hazards that silica posed. The Court's
acknowledgement enabled other courts to impute knowledge of these
hazards on employers and suppliers."' "In 1949 the U.S. Supreme Court
said '[i]t is a matter of common knowledge that it is injurious to the lungs
and dangerous to the health to work in silica dust, a fact which [a] defendant
[is] bound to know." 82
A. Urie v. Thompson
83
In Urie, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the question of whether the
health coverage of the Federal Employers' Liability Act and the Boiler
Inspection Act included injuries caused by occupational diseases such as
silicosis or was limited to injuries caused by accidents.84 In 1941, Tom Urie
brought suit against Thompson, the trustee of the Missouri Pacific Railroad,
seeking damages for being forced to stop work because he had been
diagnosed with silicosis.85  Urie had worked as a fireman on Missouri
Pacific's trains for thirty years.86 He contracted silicosis by inhaling silica
dust from the "'locomotives' sanding boxes... containing 80 to 90 per cent
of silica... [T]he locomotives' faultily adjusted 'sanders' [exceeded the]
77. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 562.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The delay can most likely be attributed to the fact that the Supreme Court's decision in Urie
v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), allowed more courts to feel comfortable imputing knowledge
about the dangers of silica on employers and suppliers.
82. Leah Lorber & Emily Laird, Silica Litigation: Judicial Controls Needed to Curb
Unwarranted, Excessive Claims, 26 No. 4 ANDREWS ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. 11 (Dec. 18, 2003).
83. 337 U.S. 163.
84. Id. at 165.
85. Id. at 165-66.
86. Id. at 165.
amounts... needed to provide traction for locomotive wheels." 87 The Court
held that Thompson should have been aware of the dangers posed by the
excess of silica in the cabs with the exercise of due care.88 The Court further
held that silicosis was an "injury" according to the definition given in the
Federal Employers' Liability Act when the "injury" results from the
employer's negligence; this was the holding despite Congress' original
purpose for enacting the Federal Employers' Liability Act, namely
compensating for injuries resulting from accidents on interstate railroads. 89
This case allowed for federal workers' compensation statutes to include
silicosis as a compensable injury, which allowed an injured party to file a
workers' compensation claim in order to recover, instead of having to go to
court.90 More important than the law at issue in Urie, was the Court's public
recognition as "'a matter of common knowledge that it is injurious to the
lungs and dangerous to health to work in silica dust. . . ."'9' After this case,
defendants could no longer play dumb to the fact that silica was hazardous to
one's health.92 Urie initiated the type of silica litigation that would exist in
the future. This case forced the question of liability to rest upon whether or
not an employer or supplier could be held accountable for the presumed
knowledge of the dangers of inhaling silica.93
"Ironically, despite the controversy and conflict over the nature of the
silicosis hazard, by the 1950's, silicosis was virtually forgotten." 94 When the
United States entered World War II, the interest in silica and silicosis came
to a halt.95 Labor and political reformers were ignored universally.96
"Silicosis was defined as a disease of the past that could be adequately
addressed by medical researchers, and engineers working with an
enlightened business community." 97  The only groups still affected by
silicosis were workers employed in dusty trades.98 Articles were written
about how silicosis was only a concern of those workers who. were
hypersensitive to dust.99  This conclusion was drawn partly because
employers now had implemented safety precautions that they thought
"reduced dust levels to 'safe' limits that posed a negligible risk to the work
force."' ° Unfortunately, the problem of silicosis, even when combated with
87. Id. at 166.
88. Id. at 179.
89. Id. at 180-81.
90. See id.
91. Id. at 180 (quoting Sadowski v. Long Island R.R. Co., 292 N.Y. 448,455-56 (1966)).
92. See, e.g., Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 561-62.
93. See, e.g., Humble Sand & Gravel v. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. App. 2001).
94. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 5. This is not truly ironic because
workers' compensation was one of the causes of the decline in silica litigation at this time. Id.
95. See id. at 6. The war shifted the nation's focus from labor reform. Id.
96. See id. at 179.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 82.
99. Id. at 181.
100. Id. at 194.
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safety equipment and protective gear, continued.' ° ' Protective gear may
reduce the problem but it cannot be completely prevented.10 2 Therefore, at
certain times, the federal government had to intervene and regulate heavy
industry in order to control the growing problem of silicosis.
10 3
Silicosis experts concluded that the changing social environment in the
United States during the 1960's and 1970's sparked a new interest in the
disease.' °4 In the 1960's, the galvanization of politically active industrial
workers would force the U.S. government and others to take notice of the
dangers silicosis posed.'0 5 During this time, doctors at Tulane University
began to study silicosis and its effect on workers in shipyards on the Gulf
Coast. 106
By the 1970's, the advanced knowledge gained about chronic disease
would cause "new constituencies [to] raise again questions that had been
asked for the first time in the early years of the Depression." 0 7  The
Occupational Safety and Health Act passed in 1970; 1 8 this act created the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare and the Occupational Health
and Safety Administration (OSHA) in the Department of Labor.Y09 These
organizations developed standards for recommended exposure limits to
hazardous materials."0 NIOSH would set the standards and OSHA would
enforce them.' NIOSH commissioned a study of safety precautions
provided for silica workers, which was done partially in response to the
earlier studies on silicosis done at Tulane. 2 The study found that most
safety equipment provided did not give workers adequate protection from
the hazardous dust."
3
In 1974, NIOSH recommended the exposure limit of silica dust be
decreased by one-half the previous recommended amount."4 They further
101. Id. at 83.
102. See generally id.
103. Id. at 83.
104. Id. at 215.
105. Id. at 215-16.
106. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1. When shipyard workers in Louisiana
began to complain about breathing difficulty, three doctors at Tulane University "began a series of
epidemiological studies that documented widespread silicosis among workers at Gulf Coast
shipyards." Id.
107. MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 216.
108. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. ("NIOSH contracted with Austin Blair, an industrial hygienist from the Boeing Aerospace
Company in Seattle, whose report proved to be an indictment of silica exposures and of the lack of
protection that respirators and protective equipment afforded workers.").
114. Bergfeld v. Unimin Corp., 319 F.3d 350, 352 (8th Cir. 2003).
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recommended that an alternative to sand should be used for abrasive
blasting.'1 5  These suggestions were made after the Tulane study of
Louisiana shipyard workers. 1 6  However, the Occupational Safety and
Health Association refused to adopt NIOSH's new recommended standards,
making them non-binding." 7 In 1975, in response to NIOSH's new
recommendations, the Silica Safety Association ("SSA") was formed by
representatives of companies in the affected industries." 8 The SSA stated
that its "goal was to 'investigate and report on possible health hazards
involved in [the] use of silica products and to recommend adequate
protective measures considered economically feasible,' but in reality its
purpose was to make sure that OSHA did not adopt the NIOSH's
recommendation standards."" 9 Its goal was to assure that sand blasting
could continue unabated. 20 The SSA engaged in devious practices in order
to accomplish its goals of convincing the silica industry that the use of
protective devices would prevent excessive exposure, when in actuality, the
SSA had imputed and actual knowledge that safety equipment did not afford
workers proper protection. 12' The SSA concealed a study that revealed that
under the SSA's promulgated standards, almost half of the air samples were
above the threshold limit value specified by the American Conference of
Governmental Industrial Hygienists. 2 "The [SSA's] lobbying effort[s] led
to countless unnecessary exposures to a known hazard in... [the] affected
industries.' 23
During this time President Jimmy Carter appointed Eula Bingham as the
head of the Occupational Health and Safety Association.1 24  Under
Bingham's leadership, more safety standards were implemented than everbefore or since. 25 The rejuvenated interest in silicosis reflected a national
resurgence of health awareness in America. 26 But when Ronald Reagan
became President, economic impact studies began to be required before the
government would implement regulations. 127 Reagan's policies resulted in
OSHA's abrasive blasting standards being made a non-issue because the
economic impact would be so great that the U.S. government did not want to
force industries to adopt higher safety regulation standards. 28 "By 1982, the
anti-regulatory and pro-business environment in Washington had all but
killed the efforts to lower the silica standard and made lobbying efforts
115. Black, supra note 1.
116. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
117. Bergfeld, 319 F.3d at 352-53.
118. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See id.
122. Id.
123. Black, supra note 1.
124. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
125. Id.
126. See MARKOWITZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 5.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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unnecessary."'' 29 In 1983, the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health estimated that 3.2 million people were exposed to silica, 30 indicating
that silica still posed a huge hazard to the American work force. As a result
of the Silica Safety Association's success in accomplishing its goals, people
stopped making monetary contributions to the association and the SSA's
board lacked the need to continue.'
13
As the Silica Safety Association closed its offices, "the silicosis
epidemic was spreading" throughout Texas. 32 The mid-1970's OPEC oil
crisis triggered a resurgence of the West Texas oil industry.1 33 Workers
were needed to clean out the old oil tankers by sand-blasting tar and oil
residue.' 34 They were not provided with adequate protective gear. 35 These
workers began to develop symptoms of silicosis and doctors began to
diagnose the workers with acute silicosis. 36 In 1988, the epidemic received
public attention and by the early 1990's "scores of workers" had developed
the disease.137 Workers began to bring lawsuits against sand providers and
equipment manufacturers. 3 Sand providers and equipment manufacturers,
unlike employers, were not protected by workers' compensation statutes that
were enacted to limit liability. 39 Also, Texas common law provided that
dangerous product suppliers had an affirmative duty to warn users of the
possible hazards.4°
During this time, the Fifth Circuit 14' held an asbestos manufacturer
liable for injuries suffered by the ultimate user of the asbestos product. 42
Following this case, asbestos litigation continued to grow and eventually
skyrocketed. 43 Plaintiffs' attorneys began to use litigation tactics developed
in the 1970's and 1980's to obtain large settlements from asbestos
manufacturers.' 44  Other plaintiffs' attorneys began to try and hold
manufacturers of products like asbestos liable for injuries suffered by also
129. Id.
130. Id. at 216 n.100.
131. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. The 5th Circuit includes Texas.
142. Black, supra note 1, at 35 (mentioning Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076 (5th Cir. 1973)).
143. Id.
144. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
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implementing these tactics. 145 They brought suits against silica suppliers and
manufacturers for the injuries suffered by the West Texas oil workers.' 6
Once a court found the manufacturer liable to the ultimate user, the
floodgates of litigation opened. 47  Employers and deep-pocketed
manufacturers and suppliers were now being held liable.148
The focus remained on asbestos among silica and asbestos suppliers and
manufacturers, the scientific community, and attorneys; therefore silica
litigation "was not pursued with the same vigor as asbestos claims.' ' 149 In
response to the litigation, some silica users began to use non-silica
substitutes as an abrasive.' 50 In an alternative response to the growing
amount of silica litigation, many companies that were members of the
National Industrial Sand Association began to put warnings on their
products.' 5' It was surprising and disheartening to know that members of the
National Industrial Sand Association knew of the hazards that silica posed as
early as the 1930's, but did not put warnings on their products until this
time. 5
2
About a decade ago, different attitudes towards silicosis existed among
experts."' "Some argue[d] that silicosis [w]as a workplace epidemic [and
wa]s over and done with, while others [saw] this disease as still potentially
disastrous to a large number of American workers."' 54 In 1997, the IARC
"published a new study regarding the carcinogenicity of crystalline silica
and concluded that crystalline silica inhaled in the form of quartz or
cristobalite from occupational sources should be classified as carcinogenic to
humans."'' 5 5 This determination has been subsequently debated. 56 When
the IARC deemed silica a carcinogen, the Occupational Safety and Health
Association [OSHA] responded by "propos[ing] a more comprehensive
crystalline silica standard in an attempt to further reduce the risk of [silicosis
and possibly cancer].' 5 7
When President Clinton was elected, his administration tried to give
new life to NIOSH and OSHA.1 8 President Clinton appointed leaders of
these organizations that had a strong interest in silica regulation. 59 Their
efforts were indicated by the 1997 National Conference to Eliminate
Silicosis, which brought together more than six-hundred federal employees,
145. Black, supra note 1.
146. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. Black, supra note 1.
150. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
151. See Black, supra note 1.
152. Id.
153. MARKOWrrZ & ROSNER, DEADLY DUST, supra note 10, at 3.
154. Id.
155. Gilligan, Jr., supra note 42, at 21.
156. Id.
157. Regis, supra note 27, at 207.
158. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
159. Id.
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public health workers, union officials, and industry representatives.
60
Silicosis and its effects were discussed among coal miners, oil workers,
foundry workers, sandblasters, and hard rock miners. 16' The sponsors of the
event, NIOSH, OSHA, and the American Lung Association, exchanged
information and shared specific techniques to prevent silicosis.1
62
The two-day event. .. highlight[ed the] "best practices" in
equipment and engineering controls, and training, respiratory
protection, and health surveillance programs, as well as other timely
topics. The goal [wals to have every participant leave the
Conference armed with practical ways to control silica dust and
prevent silicosis....
The conference generated a lot of attention for the silicosis problem.64
The American National Standards Institute 165 believes that silica should
be banned in indoor sandblasting. 166 NIOSH also seeks to ban silica as an
abrasive in blasting. 67 To combat these organizations' proposed standards
and others like it, the Silica Coalition has been formed. 68  The Silica
Coalition is a "'diverse coalition of trade associations and companies
involved in the mining, processing, production, and use of silica and silica-
containing materials,' established in 1997 in anticipation of 'OSHA
rulemaking to control worker exposure to crystalline silica dust in the not-
too-distant future."" 69  The Coalition claims to be focused on making
scientific information as well as legal resources available to companies that
could be impacted by the change in regulation, but "it is also clear that
increased awareness of the dangers of silica and the resulting threat of
litigation hang over the heads of industry executives."' 170  Part of the
Coalition consists of potential silica litigation defendants.' 71  Possible
defendants in silica litigation include: industrial sand manufacturers and
processors, bentonite manufacturers, refractory products manufacturers,
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, 1997 National Conference to Eliminate
Silicosis, at http://www.cdc.gov/nioshlnmsilcon.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2005).
163. Id.
164. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
165. Id. The American National Standards Institute is a voluntary association of industrial
hygienists and industry representatives that establishes standards for different substances. Id.
166. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1. The use of sand for abrasive blasting
has been banned in Great Britain since 1949. Black, supra note 1. Other European nations also
banned sand after Great Britain. Id.
167. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
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respiratory protection product manufacturers, grinding wheel manufacturers,
shot blast cabinet manufacturers, sandblasting compressor manufacturers,
sandblasting equipment manufacturers, ventilation system manufacturers,
construction companies, plant and refinery operators.
1 72
By the late 1990's, silicosis concerns seem to have been revitalized.'
7 3
With this revitalization came litigation. 74 The rate of silica lawsuit filings
has grown tremendously in recent years. 75  Today, silica litigation has
reached an all time high.' 76 A national sand supply company, U.S. Silica,
claims that in the course of one year the amount of lawsuits pending against
them has risen from 3,505 to 22,000.177 Other companies like 3M
Corporation and Aero Corporation also claim that their companies have seen
an increase in the number of silica claims filed against them. 7 One large
insurance company also asserts that silica claims have increased tenfold
from last year, with 25,000 in over half of the country. 179 In 1999, it was
estimated that almost 2,000,000 workers were exposed to crystalline
silica. °8 0 "'If only 10% of occupationally exposed workers (or their heirs)
believed their lung cancer or other respiratory diseases is due to their
occupational silica exposure,' then there [i]s a potential for enormous"
litigation. l '
Ill. COURTS' APPROACHES TO SILICA CLAIMS - THE SOPHISTICATED USER
DOCTRINE AND THE BULK SUPPLIER DOCTRINE
Numerous states have enacted statutes that create a non-delegable duty
for employers to keep the workplace safe for its employees. 82 Thus, if an
employer does not take the appropriate precautionary steps to provide its
employees with a safe work environment, it will be liable for the injuries
caused.183 Yet, common law products liability also places duties on those
who supply dangerous materials or provide safety equipment to warn the
potential users of a product's hazards. '8 Thus, although an employer may
be the most suitable candidate to incur liability for silica exposure to its
employees, they are not the only potential defendant.
8 1
"Despite the availability of purportedly safer alternative abrasives,
industry and silica product manufacturers have apparently concluded that the
172. Hughes, supra note 40, at 4; Warren, supra note 19, at B5.
173. See Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
174. See id.
175. Lorber & Emily Laird, supra note 82.
176. See Warren, supra note 19, at B5.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.; Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
180. Regis, supra note 27, at 209.
181. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
182. Gilligan, Jr., supra note 42, at 26.
183. Id.
184. See generally id.
185. See generally id.
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increased costs of using these alternatives outweighs the protection of...
workers."'' 8 6  While trying to limit their liability, sand suppliers have
persuaded courts to adopt the sophisticated user defense." 7 This defense
places the duty on the intermediate purchaser to warn the ultimate silica user
of its potential hazards.18  It relieves suppliers of their duty to warn.8 9
Some courts have applied this approach to silica litigation,' 90 while other
jurisdictions are still contemplating adoption.'19
The sophisticated user doctrine states that a manufacturer of a product
has no duty to warn a sophisticated user with equal knowledge of the
product's propensities. 192 Section 388 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
entitled "Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use," states that:
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for
another to use is subject to liability to those whom the supplier
should expect to use the chattel with the consent of the other or to
be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by the
use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for
whose use it is supplied, if the supplier (a) knows or has reason to
know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for the use for
which it is supplied, and (b) has no reason to believe that those for
whose use the chattel is supplied will realize its dangerous
condition, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of
its dangerous condition or of the facts which make it likely to be
dangerous. 193
The sophisticated user doctrine relieves a dangerous product supplier of
liability if the supplier has reason to believe that those who will use the
product know of its dangerous condition. 94 Therefore, in order for a
supplier to relieve itself of liability, it must show that those it supplied the
product to knew of the product's dangerous condition.1 95 The doctrine is
based on the premise that a warning given by the supplier would have little
186. Black, supra note 1.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See Bergfeld, 319 F.3d at 350; Nigh v. Dow Chem. Co., 634 F. Supp. 1513 (W.D. Wis.
1986); Haase v. Badger Mining Corp., 669 N.W.2d 737 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
191. See Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 48 S.W.3d 487 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001). This case
is currently on appeal to the Texas Supreme Court. Black, supra note 1. "[A]I involved with
silicosis litigation eagerly await the result." Id.
192. David Ziemer, Court Adopts Sophisticated User Defense, Wis. L.J., Aug. 13, 2003
(discussing the 8th Circuit's adoption of the sophisticated user defense in Bergfeld v. Unimin Corp.,
319 F.3d 350 (2003)).
193. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1965) (emphasis added).
194. Id.
195. Id.
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effect "because sophisticated users are already aware of a product's potential
adverse health effects.' 96 It also rests on the notion that "'[m]odem life
would be intolerable unless one were permitted to rely to a certain extent on
others doing what they normally do, particularly if it is their duty to do
SO.'"
19 7
Goodbar v. Whitehead Brothers'9" provides the clearest application of
the sophisticated user doctrine, "protect[ing] a supplier from liability for
failure to warn when the end user knows or reasonably should know of a
product's dangers."' 99  Defense attorneys are urging courts to apply this
doctrine in order to limit their clients' liability.2'°
A. Goodbar v. Whitehead Brothers 20
1
In this class action lawsuit comprised of failure to warn and negligence
claims, 132 foundry employees brought suit against the foundry's suppliers
of silica sand.202 Each of the plaintiffs claimed to have silicosis and was
suing the multiple defendants for failing "to advise the Foundry's employees
with respect to the dangerous characteristics of silica products and how to
protect themselves from them., 20 3 Plaintiffs' claims involving strict liability
were dismissed because Virginia has not adopted Restatement (Second) of
Torts, Section 402A, which outlines the elements of a strict liability cause of
action.204 Defendants filed for summary judgment for the duty to warn cause
of action, contending that they did not have a duty to warn the plaintiffs
"because: (1) silicosis is an occupational respiratory disease about which the
foundry industry.., has been knowledgeable since at least the 1930's; and
(2) only the Plaintiffs employer, the Lynchburg Foundry, can communicate
any type of effective warnings., 20 5  The district court applied the
196. Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
197. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 557 (citation omitted). One variation of the Sophisticated User
Doctrine, the "Sophisticated Intermediary User" is also based on § 388 of Restatement 2d. of Torts.
Lorber & Laird, supra note 82. Comment n. to § 388 "recognizes that products do not often pass
directly from the supplier to the end user but instead pass through one or more intermediary users...
before winding up in the hands of the end user." Id.
198. 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984).
199. Hughes, supra note 40, at 6 (quoting Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848,
854 (Mass. 2001)).
200. Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
201. 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984).
202. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 554.
203. Id. at 555.
204. Id. at 554. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 402A reads:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the
business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or
consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule
stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in
the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the
product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 402A (1965).
205. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 556.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 388.206 Section 388 contains three
elements that must be fulfilled in order for a defendant to assert the
sophisticated user doctrine as a defense. °7 The first element is that the
defendant "supplies a defective or dangerous product., 20 8  The second
element is that the defendant "has no reason to believe that the user (i.e. the
Plaintiff foundry employees) lacks knowledge of this defect or dangerous
condition. '20 9 The third element is that the defendant "cannot reasonably
rely upon the purchaser/employer (i.e. the Foundry) to supply necessary
warnings to Plaintiffs, the ultimate users of the product. '2'0  Defendants
conceded for argument's sake that the first two elements of the Restatement
provision were met.21' They admitted that silica is a dangerous product,
even in the more raw form, than in the form the mineral was in when it was
initially sold.212 The defendants also admitted that the plaintiffs might not
have been aware of the dangers that silica posed.213  Therefore, the
defendants' liability rested on the issue of "whether the Defendants failed to
exercise reasonable care in relying upon the Foundry to supply its employees
with the necessary information to satisfy the duty to warn.
214
"[Iln alleged negligent failure to warn situations[,]... if the danger
related to the particular product is clearly known to the purchaser/employer,
then there will be no obligation to warn placed upon the supplier., 215 The
court found that there was a "reasonable basis" for the defendants to have
believed that the Foundry would have provided their employees with
adequate warnings about silica.216 In reaching this conclusion, the court
examined the factors provided by comment n. of Section 388, which
includes: dangerous condition of the product, product's purpose, warnings
given, reliability of the third party to adequately give the warning, risk
associated with use of the product, and burden of requiring the defendant to
provide the adequate warning.2t 7 After examining the factors, the court
206. Id.
207. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 388 (1965).
208. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 556 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 388(a) (1965)).
209. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 388(b) (1965)).
210. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 388(c) (1965)).
211. Id. at 556-57.
212. Id. Although silica is a raw material (because it is a naturally occurring mineral in the earth's
crust), silica sand as it is sold is refined, thus making it more readily inhaled and thus more
dangerous. Id. at 557.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 560-61.
216. Id. at 557.
217. Id. The Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section 388, cmt. n. reads:
Warnings given to third person. Chattels are often supplied for the use of others, although
the chattels or the permission to use them are not given directly to those for whose use
they are supplied, as when a wholesale dealer sells to a retailer goods which are
obviously to be used by the persons purchasing them from him, or when a contractor
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furnishes the scaffoldings or other appliances which his subcontractor and the latter's
servants are to use, or when an automobile is lent for the borrower to use for the
conveyance of his family and friends. In all such cases the question may arise as to
whether the person supplying the chattel is exercising that reasonable care, which he
owes to those who are to use it, by informing the third person through whom the chattel is
supplied of its actual character.
Giving to the third person through whom the chattel is supplied all the information
necessary to its safe use is not in all cases sufficient to relieve the supplier from liability.
It is merely a means by which this information is to be conveyed to those who are to use
the chattel. The question remains whether this method gives a reasonable assurance that
the information will reach those whose safety depends upon their having it. All sorts of
chattels may be supplied for the use of others, through all sorts of third persons and under
an infinite variety of circumstances. This being true, it is obviously impossible to state in
advance any set of rules which will automatically determine in all cases whether one
supplying a chattel for the use of others through a third person has satisfied his duty to
those who are to use the chattel by informing the third person of the dangerous character
of the chattel, or of the precautions which must be exercised in using it in order to make
its use safe. There are, however, certain factors which are important in determining this
question. There is necessarily some chance that information given to the third person
will not be communicated by him to those who are to use the chattel. This chance varies
with the circumstances existing at the time the chattel is turned over to the third person,
or permission is given to him to allow others to use it. These circumstances include the
known or knowable character of the third person and may also include the purpose for
which the chattel is given. Modern life would be intolerable unless one were permitted to
rely to a certain extent on others' doing what they normally do, particularly if it is their
duty to do so. If the chattel is one which if ignorantly used contains no great chance of
causing anything more than some comparatively trivial harm, it is reasonable to permit
the one who supplies the chattel through a third person to rely upon the fact that the third
person is an ordinary normal man to whose discredit the supplier knows nothing, as a
sufficient assurance that information given to him will be passed on to those who are to
use the chattel.
If, however, the third person is known to be careless or inconsiderate or if the purpose for
which the chattel is to be used is to his advantage and knowledge of the true character of
the chattel is likely to prevent its being used and so to deprive him of this advantage-as
when goods so defective as to be unsalable are sold by a wholesaler to a retailer-the
supplier of the chattel has reason to expect, or at least suspect, that the information will
fail to reach those who are to use the chattel and whose safety depends upon their
knowledge of its true character. In such a case, the supplier may well be required to go
further than to tell such a third person of the dangerous character of the article, or, if he
fails to do so, to take the risk of being subjected to liability if the information is not
brought home to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel. In many cases
the burden of doing so is slight, as when the chattel is to be used in the presence or
vicinity of the person supplying it, so that he could easily give a personal warning to
those who are to use the chattel. Even though the supplier has no practicable opportunity
to give this information directly and in person to those who are to use the chattel or share
in its use, it is not unreasonable to require him to make good any harm which is caused
by his using so unreliable a method of giving the information which is obviously
necessary to make the chattel safe for those who use it and those in the vicinity of its use.
Here, as in every case which involves the determination of the precautions which must be
taken to satisfy the requirements of reasonable care, the magnitude of the risk involved
must be compared with the burden which would be imposed by requiring them (see §
291), and the magnitude of the risk is determined not only by the chance that some harm
may result but also the serious or trivial character of the harm which is likely to result
(see § 293). Since the care which must be taken always increases with the danger
involved, it may be reasonable to require those who supply through others chattels which
if ignorantly used involve grave risk of serious harm to those who use them and those in
the vicinity of their use, to take precautions to bring the information home to the users of
such chattels which it would be unreasonable to demand were the chattels of a less
dangerous character.
Thus, while it may be proper to permit a supplier to assume that one through whom he
supplies a chattel which is only slightly dangerous will communicate the information
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found that "a plethora of material exist[ed] on the... Foundry's extensive
knowledge of the hazards of inhaling silica dust, the disease of silicosis, and
proper dust control methods." 2Is
The court imputed the American Foundrymen's Society's knowledge
about silicosis onto the foundry through the company's vice president who
was an active member of the society. 219 The American Foundrymen's
Society maintained an extensive knowledge about the dangers of silica and
silicosis since the 1930's.220
The court also noted the difficulties that present themselves to sand
suppliers in trying to adequately warn foundry employees of the dangers in
the use of sand.221 Some of the difficulties that face the suppliers include:
the extensive amount of monitoring required to determine how the sand is
used, the inability of product warnings placed on packages to effectively
communicate the warnings given, the inability to provide training and
facilities that would reduce silica exposure, and the unrealistic goal of
pressuring foundries to follow certain safety measures.222 Through close
examination and balancing of the factors listed above, the district court
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant sand suppliers by
finding that the employers were able to more adequately warn their
given him to those who are to use it unless he knows that he other is careless, it may be
improper to permit him to trust the conveyance of the necessary information of the actual
character of a highly dangerous article to a third person of whose character he knows
nothing. It may well be that he should take the risk that this information may not be
communicated, unless he exercises reasonable care to ascertain the character of the third
person, or unless from previous experience with him or from the excellence of his
reputation the supplier has positive reason to believe that he is careful. In addition to this,
if the danger involved in the ignorant use of a particular chattel is very great, it may be
that the supplier does not exercise reasonable care in entrusting the communication of the
necessary information even to a person whom he has good reason to believe to be careful.
Many such articles can be made to carry their own message to the understanding of those
who are likely to use them by the form in which they are put out, by the container in
which they are supplied, or by a label or other device, indicating with a substantial
sufficiency their dangerous character. Where the danger involved in the ignorant use of
their true quality is great and such means of disclosure are practicable and not unduly
burdensome, it may well be that the supplier should be required to adopt them. There are
many statutes which require that articles which are highly dangerous if used in ignorance
of their character, such as poisons, explosives, and inflamnables, shall be put out in such
a form as to bear on their face notice of their dangerous character, either by the additional
coloring matter, the form or color of the containers, or by labels. Such statutes are
customarily construed as making one who supplies such articles not so marked liable,
even though he has disclosed their actual character to the person to whom he directly
gives them for the use of others, and even though the statute contains no express
provisions on the subject.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of TORTS § 388 (1965).
218. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 561.
219. Id. at 562.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 566.
222. Id.
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employees about the hazards of silica dust than was the initial supplier.223
Goodbar v. Whitehead Brothers was one of the first cases to relieve a
defendant silica sand supplier of liability for injuries suffered by employees
from the contraction of silicosis though application of the sophisticated user
defense.2 Soon after, Bergfeld v. Unimin Corporation 225 was decided by
one of the courts influenced by the Goodbar decision.
B. Bergfeld v. Unimin Corporation 226
Roger Bergfeld was employed at Dubuque Works Foundry for fourteen
years,227 where Lockheed Martin supplied the silica sand.228 Bergfeld
brought a products liability action against Lockheed Martin and other
defendants when he contracted silicosis, claiming that Lockheed had failed
to provide the foundry or its employees with the proper information about
the risk of contracting silicosis when being exposed to respirable silica
dust.229 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals asserted that the sophisticated
user doctrine "is a rule of negligence, not one of strict liability. '230 Applying
the sophisticated user doctrine, the Eighth Circuit found that Lockheed had
"no duty to warn if the user knows or should know of the potential danger,
especially when the user is a professional who should be aware of the
characteristics of the product. '23' In so holding, the court noted that the
foundry itself was "in a better position to convey warnings to the
employees., 232 The court cited Goodbar v. Whitehead Brothers233 and Smith
v. Walter C. Best, Inc.,234 two cases where courts also found defendant
suppliers of silica sand not liable for failure of duty to warn, because the
suppliers were not in an adequate position to give warnings to foundry
employees.235
Courts have also applied the bulk supplier doctrine included in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts on products liability to relieve a supplier of
bulk products or raw materials of a duty toward end users of a product when
the products are delivered to sophisticated intermediary buyers.236 The bulk
supplier doctrine is based on the rationale that these types of suppliers sell
silica and other raw materials to a wide variety of customers and it is
223. Id. at 565.
224. See Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. 552.
225. 319 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2003).
226. Id.
227. Id. at 352.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 353 (citing Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 623 (Iowa 2000)).
231. Id. (quoting Vandelune v. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943, 946 (8th Cir.
1998)).
232. Id. at 354 (citing Smith v. Walter C. Best Inc., 927 F.2d 736, 740 (3d Cir. 1990)).
233. 591 F. Supp 552 (W.D. Va. 1984)
234. 927 F.2d 736 (3d Cir. 1990).
235. Bergfeld, 319 F.3d at 354.
236. See Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
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difficult to determine what the intended use of these materials will be.237
Restatement (Third) of Torts, Products Liability Section 5, Comment c.,
states that "'[t]o impose a duty to warn would require the seller to develop
expertise regarding a multitude of different end products and to investigate
the actual use of raw materials by [employers] over whom the supplier has
no control.' 238  Comment c. also states that raw materials cannot be
defectively designed.3
Sand suppliers have tried to capitalize on the idea that raw materials
cannot be defectively designed by claiming that sand is a natural material
and therefore cannot be defective. 240 But this idea is not completely correct
because "industrial sands are processed and refined." 24'  Although, silica
sand is a raw material, because the sand is refined, some courts may not
define silica sand as a raw material within the definition provided in the
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability Section 5, and consequently
not relieve sand suppliers of liability based on the bulk user doctrine. The
court in Gray v. Allied Products, Inc. acknowledged "'[f]oundry sand, unlike
'natural' sand is specifically refined for its size, which is precisely which
[sic] makes it respirable and dangerous... [Tihe sand supplied... to the
foundry cannot be obtained simply by proceeding to the nearest beach.' 242
In Gray,243 the trial court denied the defendants' motion for summary
judgment based on the bulk user doctrine. The Gray court found that sand
237. Id.
238. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 reporter's note to
cmt. c (1998)).
239. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 reporter's note to cmt. c, (1998).
Comment c. reads:
Raw Materials. Product components include raw materials. See Comment a. Thus, when
raw materials are contaminated or otherwise defective within the meaning of § 2(a), the
seller of the raw materials is subject to liability for harm caused by such defects.
Regarding the seller's exposure to liability for defective design, a basic raw material
such as sand, gravel, or kerosene cannot be defectively designed. Inappropriate decisions
regarding the use of such materials are not attributable to the supplier of the raw materials
but rather to the fabricator that puts them to improper use. The manufacturer of the
integrated product has a significant comparative advantage regarding selection of
materials to be used. Accordingly, raw-materials sellers are not subject to liability for
harm caused by defective design of the end-product. The same considerations apply to
failure-to-warn claims against sellers of raw materials. To impose a duty to warn would
require the seller to develop expertise regarding a multitude of different end-products and
to investigate the actual use of raw materials by manufacturers over whom the supplier
has no control. Courts uniformly refuse to impose such an onerous duty to warn. For a
consideration of whether special circumstances may give rise to a duty on the part of raw-
material sellers to warn of risks attending integration of raw materials with other
components.
Id. (emphasis added).
240. Hughes, supra note 40, at 1.
241. Id. at 6.
242. Id. (quoting Gray v. Allied Mineral Prods., Inc., P199-66 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2002)).
243. Gray v. Allied Mineral Prods., Inc., P199-66 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2002).
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supplied by the defendant was never incorporated into an end product and
therefore sand suppliers did not need to determine what end products might
be and who the end users are and therefore it did not need to warn them of
the dangers of inhaling silica. 244 The appeals court subsequently reversed
the Minnesota district court's ruling in Gray and applied what the court
called the "sophisticated user doctrine."'245
C. Gray v. Badger Mining Corporation
246
Plaintiff Lawrence Gray contracted silicosis at a foundry which was
supplied silica sand by the Badger Mining Corporation.247 Gray brought suit
against Badger Mining Corporation alleging that the company failed to warn
about the threat of silicosis when working with silica.248 The Badger Mining
Corporation countered Gray's claims by asserting the sophisticated user
doctrine.249 Badger claimed that Gray's employer had a duty to warn Gray
of the dangers of working with silica because the employer was in the best
position to warn its employees.250 The court framed the issue as "whether
Badger had a legal duty to warn Gray about potential hazards of inhaling
silica. '251 The court noted that the foundry industry has been made aware of
the dangers of silica for over one hundred years due to the formation of the
American Foundrymen's Society, whose purpose was to educate workers
about foundry processes and the threats silica posed.25 2 The court held that
"because [Gray's] employer (the foundry) was a sophisticated purchaser of a
dangerous product, [Badger] did not have a duty to warn [Gray]. 253
Another case that has applied the sophisticated user doctrine in a
different manner is Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez.254 In this case,
Raymond Gomez, an abrasive blaster, brought suit against Humble Sand &
244. Hughes, supra note 40, at 5. The rationale behind the Bulk User Doctrine is that the case law
imposing a duty to warn immediate buyers of general dangers attendant to use of a raw material or
component is clear.
Sellers of components and raw materials have a duty to provide reasonable warnings.
See, e.g., Hill v. Wilmington Chem. Corp., 156 N.W.2d 898,902 (Minn. 1968). The issue
is whether the seller of a component or raw material has a duty to inform itself about
specific applications of its component and a further duty to determine whether the buyer
who will integrate it into another product is knowledgeable as to the dangers attendant to
that specific application. No cases have been found imposing such an onerous duty.
Indeed, the entire thrust of the case law is that when the product component is not
defective in itself, liability only arises when the component seller substantially
participates in the design of the final integrated product.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT 3D of TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILrrY § 5, reporters' notes to cmt. c. (1998)).
245. Gray, 664 N.W.2d at 885.
246. Id. at 881.
247. Id. at 882-83.
248. Id. at 883.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. ld.
252. Id. at 884.
253. Id. at 887.
254. 48 S.W.3d 487, 495-96 (Tex. App. 2001), rev'd on other grounds, 146 S.W.2d 170 (Tex.
2004).
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Gravel, Inc., one of his employer's silica suppliers, for failure to warn
against the dangers of the use of silica in abrasive blasting. 2 ' Rather than
absolving a silica supplier of a duty to warn its potential users, the Humble
Sand court imposed a duty to warn on the silica supplier.256 The Texas
Court of Appeals found that those parties who wish to invoke the
sophisticated user doctrine must show they provided adequate warnings to
the parties or intermediaries that they supplied silica to, or that a warning
was unnecessary because the intermediaries possessed knowledge of the
hazards that silica posed. 7  The Humble Sand court ruled that
"[m]anufacturers of silica flint who do not provide the product in bulk
should be required to adequately warn the ultimate user. This requirement
results from the grave health risks of silicosis and from the minute cost and
effort tha[t] an adequate warning would require. ''218 The case has been
appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas.259  The ruling will have vast
implications on future silica litigation for many reasons: one such reason is
that because Texas is known as a plaintiff-friendly jurisdiction,260 adopting
the sophisticated user doctrine will make the state unfriendly to silica
plaintiffs. Another reason is that since Texas is such a big state with a large
population of potential plaintiffs that have been exposed to silica,2 6' adoption
of the doctrine will make it more difficult for a significant number of
plaintiffs to recover. A final reason is the possible persuasive influence that
the Supreme Court of Texas could have on other states in their decisions to
adopt the sophisticated user doctrine.
In 2004, the Supreme Court of Texas delivered its ruling in Humble
Sand & Gravel v. Gomez.262 When examining the issue of "whether a
supplier.., had a duty to warn its customers' employees that inhalation of
silica dust can be fatal", the court discussed much of the history of silica
litigation. Silica suppliers were not required to give warnings to abrasive
blasting operators of the dangers that silica posed because "a supplier has no
duty to warn of risks involved in a product's use that are commonly known
to foreseeable users, even if some users are not aware of them., 263 Instead
of making an outright decision of whether to adopt the sophisticated user
doctrine, the court remanded the case for a new trial asking for more
evidence.264 The court declared that it could not determine whether "a duty
255. Id. at 493.
256. Hughes, supra note 40, at 7 (citing Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc., 48 S.W.3d at 498).
257. Id. (citing Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc., 48 S.W.3d at 497-98).
258. Id. (quoting Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. 48 S.W.3d at 498).
259. See Humble Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Gomez, 146 S.W.2d 170 (Tex. 2004).
260. See Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
261. See Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
262. 146 S.W. 2d 170 (Tex. 2004).
263. Id. at 183.
264. Id. at 173.
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to warn should be imposed on [silica] suppliers ' 265 without evidence that the
"warnings by [silica] suppliers could effectively reach their customers'
employees. '266 The dissent vehemently disagreed with the court's decision,
proclaiming "[t]he Court's improper application of the sophisticated-user
doctrine in this case establishes a dangerous precedent that severely
undermines worker safety. 267
The implications of this ruling have yet to be seen. The court seems to
be leaning towards absolving most silica suppliers of a duty 'to warn
potential users. Once the case has been retried and Humble Sand & Gravel,
Inc., presents evidence to show the effectiveness or lack thereof of a warning
given, it will become clearer whether plaintiffs will be able to successfully
bring failure to warn causes of action against silica suppliers. But from
examining the Texas Supreme Court opinion, plaintiffs' attorneys may need
to develop a new cause of action in order to try and hold silica suppliers
liable for injuries to silica sand users because a failure to warn claim may be
too difficult to bring.
D. Plaintiffs and Defense Attorneys' Thoughts on The Sophisticated User
and The Bulk Supplier Doctrines
Plaintiffs and defense attorneys disagree about the application of these
two doctrinal defenses.268 In defense attorney Leah Lorber's article, Silica
Litigation: Judicial Controls Needed to Curb Unwarranted Excessive
Claims, she argues that "courts should apply hornbook law to allow
legitimate silica personal-injury claims and, accordingly, should place
liability on the party who is best able to prevent injuries in the future. 269
Lorber urges courts to adopt the sophisticated user doctrine and the bulk user
doctrine discussed in the Restatement of Torts. 270 Lorber insists that courts
should apply these doctrines to silica litigation because they place the burden
of warning those who are at risk of silica exposure on employers and
intermediaries instead of the initial supplier or manufacturer. 27 ' Exposing
employers to greater liability would force them to adopt better safety
precautions and in turn help prevent workers from contracting silicosis.
27 2
Plaintiffs' attorney James M. Hughes disagrees with Lorber.273 Hughes
wants courts to reject the sophisticated user doctrine and require a warning
despite a plaintiffs possible knowledge of the risk of silica exposure,
because of the great dangers that silica presents.274 Hughes also argues that
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 198 (O'Neill, J., dissenting).
268. See Lorber & Laird, supra note 82; see also Hughes, supra note 40, at 4.
269. Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See Hughes, supra note 40, at 6-7.
274. Id. at 7.
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the defenses are "often misapplied. '275  Hughes recognizes Goodbar v.
Whitehead Brothers276 as the "most highly touted application" of the
sophisticated user doctrine, but that the Goodbar court actually applied the
bulk supplier doctrine, 277 illustrating courts' misapplication. Hughes asserts
that misapplication of the bulk supplier doctrine relieved defendants of
liability, when in actuality, with proper application of the doctrine "the bulk
supplier is by, no means absolved of its duty either to supply adequate
warnings to the intermediary or to ensure that its reliance on the
intermediary is reasonable. 27
From examining the defense and plaintiffs attorneys' perspectives on
these types of affirmative defenses, it is evident that defense attorneys want
the defenses adopted in all jurisdictions because the defenses limit certain
defendants' liability, while plaintiffs' attorneys want jurisdictions to place a
duty to warn on silica suppliers and manufacturers in order to increase
liability. Applying the sophisticated user and the bulk supplier doctrines
nave nimited plaintiffs' potential recovery when some of these suppliers and
manufacturers have knowingly sold a dangerous product.2 79  The theory
behind the doctrine that places liability on employers in order to force
employers to adopt adequate safety measures sounds effective, but in reality
could possibly be ineffective because employers' liability has been limited
by workers' compensation statutes.28°  If employers will not face the
consequences of their liability because their liability is limited by workers'
compensation, the purpose of the application of these affirmative defenses
could be futile.281
IV. ASBESTOS LITIGATION AT A GLANCE
After World War II, asbestos was used as a key ingredient in many
different products, like insulation, floor tiles, roofing shingles, blankets,
aprons, and corks.282  The medical community had determined that
inhalation of asbestos fibers could cause lung cancer as early as the
275. Id. at 4.
276. 591 F. Supp. 552 (W.D. Va. 1984).
277. Hughes, supra note 40, at 6. Hughes notes that Goodbar was "predicated... on the 'bulk
supplier' factor that the supplier could not have provided direct warnings to the employees." Id.
278. Id. at 4 (quoting Hoffman v. Houghton Chem. Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848, 857 (Mass. 2001)).
279. See Black, supra note 1.
280. See MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL, supra note 18.
281. The purpose of the sophisticated user and bulk supplier doctrines is to place liability on
employers since they have the greatest ability to protect their employees from injury. When
workers' compensation statutes allow employers to escape liability, there is nothing forcing
employers to make conditions safer for their employees.
282. Kathryn Kranhold & Shailagh Murray, Unsettling Dust: Asbestos Factions Struggle to Settle
Their 30-Year War. WALL ST. J., Oct. 15, 2003, at Al.
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1930'S.283 Although the asbestos-producing industry had knowledge that
asbestos caused lung cancer, the public and those who were exposed to it did
not learn of the hazards that asbestos posed until the 1970's. Since the
public discovery of the cover-up of the harmful effects of asbestos fibers on
the human lungs, asbestos claims have been litigated for more than thirty
years.284 Plaintiffs' attorneys have been filing lawsuits on behalf of all types
of Americans, including miners, shipbuilders, construction workers, and
their wives and children.285 Manufacturers and sellers of asbestos products
have faced vast numbers of personal injury claims for asbestos exposure,
2816and the litigation continues. In response to all of these lawsuits,
companies slowly stopped using asbestos to create products. 28 7  "In part
because use of new asbestos basically ceased, and in part because many
asbestos producers and suppliers were bankrupted fairly quickly, most
observers believed that the asbestos litigation eventually would fade. That
has not happened. In fact, quite the opposite has occurred. 288
Asbestos has become a litigation crisis that plagues the country's courts'
dockets. 289  There are different reasons that can explain the explosion of
asbestos litigation.29° One reason is the relaxed procedural and substantive
rules that some courts have adopted in order to make the judicial process
more efficient for asbestos plaintiffs. 29' Another reason "for the phenomenal
increase in asbestos cases is the explosion in the number of claims filed by
unimpaired or mildly impaired plaintiffs. 292  Although the early cases
involved people who had actually suffered devastating injuries from asbestos
exposure, the new plaintiffs of the present have not suffered. 293 "The truly
sick are having trouble getting compensation because the healthy are
clogging the courts. 294
This explosion of litigation has no end in sight.2 95 According to a study
by the Rand Institute of Civil Justice, over the past three decades, over six-
hundred-thousand asbestos related lawsuits have been filed.296 Rand also
estimates that there are 2.4 million asbestos victims that have not filed
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Asbestos Litigation and Bankruptcy: A Case Study for Ad Hoc Public
Policy Limitations on Joint and Several Liability, 31 PEPP. L. REv. 203,205 (2004).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. See Kranhold & Murray, supra note 282, at Al.
290. Cupp, Jr., supra note 286.
291. Id. at 206.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 207. ("By 1997 ... the U.S. Supreme Court observed that 'up to one half of asbestos
claims are now filed by people who have little or no physical impairment.' More recent reports
estimate that up to ninety percent of new asbestos claims are filed by unimpaired or mildly impaired
plaintiffs." (quoting Amchem Prods. Inc. v Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 629 (1997)).
294. Editorial, Asbestos Games, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2003, at A12.
295. Cupp, Jr., supra note 286, at 210.
296. Kranhold & Murray, supra note 282, at Al.
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claims and their claims could amount to 210 billion dollars.297 Defendants
estimate that 300,000 settlements are pending around the country.298 In the
wake of all of this asbestos litigation, huge businesses have been forced into
bankruptcy. 299 Tens of thousands of workers have lost their jobs and
retirement plans.
30°
"Many of these [asbestos] claims are generated by for-profit screening
enterprises that work closely with plaintiffs' law firms."30 1 Some plaintiffs'
attorneys have made a cottage industry out of asbestos litigation. 0 2 Defense
attorneys and their clients have become extremely concerned that these same
types of for-profit screening enterprises are beginning to work closely with
law firms that represent silica plaintiffs.3 3 More importantly, potential
defendants and their attorneys worry that the devastating effects of asbestos
litigation could be felt across the silica community as well. 3°
V. DEFENSE AND PLAINTIFFS ATTORNEYS' THOUGHTS ON THE CURRENT
STATE OF SILICA LITIGATION
Defense attorney Leah Lorber has become concerned about the current
state of silica litigation. In her article, "Silica Litigation: Judicial Controls
Needed to Curb Unwarranted, Excessive Claims," she quickly acknowledges
that the rate of silica lawsuits filings has dramatically increased in recent
years.30 5 She also notes that many of the same lawyers from asbestos
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Cupp, Jr., supra note 286, at 205 n.13.
The "first wave" of asbestos bankruptcies occurred between 1978 and 1985 when seven
major asbestos manufacturers and suppliers declared bankruptcy including North
American Asbestos Corp. (1978), Johns Manville (1982), Amatex Corp. (1982), UNR
Industries (1982) (including Union Asbestos & Rubber), Waterman Steamship Corp.
(1983), Wallace & Gale Co. (1984), and Forty-Eight Insulations (1985). The next wave
occurred between 1986 and 1993, and involved companies with significant asbestos
liability, such as Pacor (1986), Prudential Lines (1986), Standard Insulations Inc. (1986),
Gatke Corporation (1987), Nicolet (1987), Delaware Insulations (1989), Hillborough
Holdings (1989), Raytech Corporation (1989) (including Raymark Industries and
Raymark Corporation), Celotex (1990) (including Carey Canada, Panacon, Philip Carey
Co., and Smith & Kanzler), National Gypsum (1990), Standard Asbestos Manufacturing
& Insulation (1990), Eagle Pitcher Industries (1991), and H.K. Porter (1991) (including
Southern Asbestos Company and Southern Textile).
Id. (citing Mark D. Plevin & Paul W. Kalish, Where Are They Now? A History of the Companies that
Have Sought Bankruptcy Protection Due to Asbestos Claims, 17-20 MEALEY'S LmG. REP.:
ASBESTOS 18 (2002)).
300. Editorial, Asbestos Games, WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2003, at A12.
301. Cupp, Jr., supra note 286, at 207.
302. See Warren, supra note 19, at B5.
303. See Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
304. See id.
305. Id.
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litigation are bringing these silicosis claims.3° 6 She finds herself concerned
with these facts because there is not "a burgeoning silica medical crisis to
explain this increase in lawsuit filings."3 °7  Lorber suspects that greedy
plaintiffs' attorneys are the actual "burgeoning" crisis. 30 8
Lorber points to NIOSH's statistics to illustrate that silicosis related
deaths and injuries have decreased since the initial great silicosis tragedies of
the 1930's.
Over the past 30 years, the annual number of silica related deaths
has dropped... from 1,157 in 1968, to 308 in 1990, to 187 in
1999.309 To put these figures into context, the federal government
reports that on average, 400 people in the United States die each
year from extreme heat and that 155 workers die annually in falls
from rooftops.3 l °
Lorber continues that "[flindings of silicosis cases today are so rare tha[t]
one specialist remarked that '[slilicosis is becoming more of a radiology
curiosity."'
31
She also points out that, "coincidentally," the majority of silica lawsuits
are filed in "so-called 'magic jurisdictions' where plaintiffs are likely to
make a big recovery, ' 312 like Texas and Mississippi. 313  Yet states with
greater populations or the highest silica mortality rates have seen far less
silica lawsuit filings.314
Lorber believes that "[tihe recent increase in silica lawsuits after years
of relatively stable dockets may reflect efforts by plaintiffs' lawyers to 'beat
the clock' and file their cases before new tort-reform legislation takes effect
in a number of states. 31 5 She suggests that another possible reason for the
recent escalation might be a response to the asbestos litigation reforms at the
state and federal level that have precipitated plaintiffs' attorneys
implementing the same asbestos litigation tactics in silica lawsuits, such as
mass screenings.1 6
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id.
309. Id. (citing NIOSH statistics); see also Warren, supra note 19, at B5.
310. Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
311. Id. (quoting Jerry Mitchell, Silica Suits Latest to Hit Miss. Courts: More Than 17,000
Plaintiffs Claim to Have Incurable Lung Disease, CLAIRON-LEDGER, Oct. 19, 2003, at IA.
312. Id. (citing Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation: A Discussion With Richard Scruggs
& Victor Schwartz, 17-3 MEALEY'S LITG. REP.: ASBESTOS 19 (2002)).
313. Id. (citing Jonathan D. Glater, Suits on Silica Being Compared to Asbestos Cases, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 2003, at Cl; James Doran & Helen Leonard, Claims Surge as U.S. Lawyers See
Silica as the New Asbestos, THE TIMES, Sept. 10, 2003, at 4M).
314. Id. (citing 2002 NIOSH WORK-RELATED LUNG DISEASE SURVEILLANCE REP., at xxiv, 58).
315. Id.
316. Id. ("For example, marketing materials sent by a medical screening company to a plaintiffs'
law firm suggested the screening company could increase the firm's business, showcased it number
of positive screenings in other states and asked for the opportunity to produce the same 'remarkable
results for your law firm."' (quoting Letter from Lloyd Criss, Gulf Coast Marketing, to M. Davis
Ready (May 9, 2003)).
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Other defense attorneys agree with Lorber that the increase in silica
claims can be attributed to the constraints that have been placed on asbestos
litigation.3 17 They find it a telling coincidence that silica claims are on the
rise at the very same time as the asbestos legislation that limits recovery is
being proposed.3t 8
While defense attorneys have different reasons for their angst felt about
the sudden increase in silica lawsuit filings, the reason for Lorber's greatest
concern is that the truly sick may be unable to recover.319 When courtrooms
are clogged by healthy plaintiffs, the sick claimants will be unable to
recover.320 If silica is to be anything like asbestos, Lorber suggests that
measures must be taken to try and prevent a repeat of the situation in
asbestos litigation where "claimants are not sick and may never develop an
asbestos-related disease," which prevents the truly crippled from receiving
deserved compensation. 2
Defense attorney Thomas Gilligan takes a similar view to Lorber's
concerning the sudden resurgence of silica lawsuit filings.322  He wrote,
"[firom a litigation standpoint, plaintiffs' attorneys have created a model for
asbestos litigation that can easily be converted to silica litigation. 323 Some
attorneys and journalists have commented that many of the defendants are
similar,3 2 4 but Gilligan notes that many defendants are new because they are
solvent.325 He then acknowledges that it may be an exaggeration to classify
silica as the next asbestos, but also recognizes that those involved with
silica-related industries and products should be wary of the devastating
affects asbestos had on the industry.326 Gilligan warns potential defendants
of the possibility of plaintiffs' attorneys imputing actual or constructive
knowledge of silica's history as a deadly occupational disease, like courts
have done in cases like Goodbar.327
Defense attorneys argue that courts should learn from the huge problems
that asbestos litigation caused, claiming that "[tlhe lesson of asbestos is
instructive, because silica litigation is at a tipping point. Silica litigation can
and should be carefully guided by the courts to make sure that it does not
317. Warren, supra note 19, at B5.
318. Id.
319. See Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
320. See Cupp, Jr., supra note 286, at 207-08.
321. See Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
322. See Gilligan, Jr., supra note 42, at 19-20.
323. Id.
324. See Warren, supra note 19.
325. Gilligan, Jr., supra note 42, at 22.
326. Id.
327. Id.
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spiral out of control and result in the same problems as the asbestos
litigation. 328
Plaintiffs' attorney, James M. Hughes responds to defense attorneys'
assertions that silica is the next asbestos.329 Hughes, in his article entitled
Silica Litigation From Both Sides of the Bar: Is Silica the Next Asbestos?
The Plaintiff's Perspective, addresses defense attorneys' claims about silica
litigation. 330 He posits that defense attorneys are creating a big discussion
over silica litigation because they "have a vested interest in trying to
convince the courts and the public that silica is the next asbestos. 33'
Hughes avers that defense attorneys are trying to "make the court sick of
silica litigation at the outset, ' 332 along with "press[ing] the policy argument
that silica litigation will inevitably result in clogged courts, unreasonable
verdicts, and bankrupt defendants. 333  Hughes also insists that defense
attorneys are "attempt[ing] to use any asbestos plaintiffs' counsel's
misbehavior or discovery abuses as a brush to tar all the plaintiffs'
counsel.,
334
Hughes first addresses the asbestos litigation nightmare. He contends
that the asbestos litigation nightmare was not caused by plaintiffs' attorneys,
but rather by the misdeeds of asbestos defendants.
Asbestos has injured and killed tens of thousands of people; ...
many asbestos defendants made conscious efforts to conceal, at
worst, and exercised benign neglect, at best, in the face of
knowledge about the hazards of asbestos; and... punitive damage
awards in the asbestos arena give some indication of the
wrongfulness of the asbestos defendants' actions. In short, sick and
deceased asbestos plaintiffs and their counsel created considerably
less of the asbestos litigation nightmare than did asbestos
defendants and asbestos itself.335
Hughes also notes that silica litigation could not rival asbestos litigation
in "scope, breadth, or financial impact. '336 He compares the amount of
asbestos cases in certain jurisdictions with the amount of silica cases in those
jurisdictions and finds that the number of silica cases is "minuscule"
compared to the number of asbestos cases. 337
Some plaintiffs' attorneys scoff at the idea that silica is the next
asbestos, asserting that this notion is being concocted by defense attorneys to
328. Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
329. See Hughes, supra note 40, at 1, 3.
330. Id. at 3-7.
331. Id. at 3.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 4.
337. Id. Hughes bases this statement on "anecdotal evidence." Id.
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stifle plaintiff recovery,338 while others are hopeful in some ways that silica
will become the next asbestos. 339 Rick Nemeroff, a Dallas plaintiffs'
attorney who specializes in silica after doing extensive work in asbestos
litigation, is quoted in the Wall Street Journal as saying, "Why reinvent the
wheel? '340 Nemeroff acknowledges that the "two ailments [asbestosis and
silicosis], both mainly acquired by breathing mineral dust in construction
and industrial settings, naturally overlap."'34' He is excited about using the
so-called "asbestos litigation machinery" and applying it to silica.342
Other plaintiffs' attorneys contend that the increase in silica litigation
comes from a greater awareness about silicosis that has been ignited by
government and scientific communities' debate over the proper threshold
limit value of exposure, as well as the debate over protective equipments and
the appropriate safety precautions.343  This sentiment is echoed by silica
experts Gerald Markowitz and David Rosner, who agree that new silicosis
claims are most likely to be attributed to the increased awareness about
silicosis. '4 Other experts agree, claiming:
[t]he current rise in claims is the result of the latency of pulmonary
dust disease and increased awareness among affected workers.
Government agencies have begun efforts to alert workers and
physicians of the silica hazard and its associated diseases. Although
silica litigation is not expected to reach the scope or magnitude of
asbestos litigation, there remain thousands of injured workers that
deserve compensation. Exposures to silica continue today, and
without an outright ban on the use of silica in blasting and foundry
applications, the number of injured workers is likely to continue
into the foreseeable future.345
VI. COMPARING SILICA AND ASBESTOS LITIGATION
Silica and asbestos have been discussed together for many reasons. One
reason is that silicosis and asbestosis are both diseases that affect the
lungs.3'46 The diseases also occur in a similar class of people, for the most
338. Id.
339. See Warren, supra note 19.
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Markowitz & Rosner, The Reawakening, supra note 1.
345. Black, supra note 1.
346. See Hughes, supra note 40.
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part industrial workers. 7  But most of all, the amount of silica lawsuit
filings has skyrocketed in recent years in a way that reminds one of the
increase in asbestos lawsuit filings over a decade ago.348
Also silica litigation presently involves many of the same players as
asbestos litigation. Some of the same defendants involved in asbestos
litigation including: Ingersoll Rand Company, Betchel Corporation, Sherwin
Williams Company, Union Carbide Corporation, Pfizer Incorporated, Allied
Signal, and Du Pont Company are also being sued for injuries caused by
exposure to silica.349 Silica litigation has also involved some of the same
plaintiffs as asbestos litigation. Dallas defense attorney Steve Russell asserts
that "he has seen many silicosis cases where the plaintiff already has
collected a settlement from an asbestos lawsuit. ' 350
Despite many of the same plaintiffs and defendants being involved in
asbestos and silica litigation, at present the potential asbestos plaintiffs are
far greater in amount than the potential silica plaintiffs because more people
have been exposed to asbestos than to respirable silica.35 ' A bigger plaintiff
pool indicates that there is greater potential for more asbestos litigation. Yet
this larger plaintiff pool may not always exist. Once the general public
became aware of the devastating effects of asbestos exposure, asbestos
manufacturers ceased production of the chemical. 2  Yet, although silica
exposure is known to have devastating effects similar to that of asbestos
exposure, silica continues to be used in abrasive blasting and other related
trades.353 With workers continuing to use silica, the plaintiff pool increases
everyday, although it is unlikely it could possibly surpass that of asbestos
cases.
354
Also, even though some of the defendants are the same, there are other
defendants in asbestos litigation that are, quite distinguishable from those in
silica litigation.355 Asbestos is produced more by large national companies,
347. See DYING FOR WORK: WORKERS' SAFETY AND HEALTH IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA
(Gerald Markowitz & David Rosner, eds., 1987) [hereinafter DYING FOR WORK].
348. Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
349. Warren, supra note 19, at B5.
350. Id.
351. Hughes, supra note 40. From 1987 to 1996, asbestosis was the cause of twenty-eight percent
of deaths caused by a work-related lung disease in the United States, whereas silicosis was only the
cause of eight percent of deaths caused by work-related lung disease. Id. The higher death rate
indicates that more people have been exposed to asbestos and that asbestos exposure could possibly
be more lethal. See id.
352. See Cupp, Jr., supra note 286, at 205.
353. Protective equipment and respirators can only reduce the amount of silica inhaled, they
cannot prevent exposure. Nat'l Institute for Occupational Safety & Health, NIOSH Issues
Nationwide Alert on Silicosis, at http://www.cdc.gov/nioshl93-123.html (Nov. 18, 1992) (last visited
Apr. 2, 2005). Any exposure to silica is dangerous. Id.
354. Hughes, supra note 40, at 1. Deaths caused by silicosis have dramatically decreased from the
1960's to the 1990's, whereas deaths caused by asbestosis have increased from less than one-
hundred per year in the late 1960's to over one-thousand in the mid 1990's. Id. This statistic
indicates that although the silica plaintiff pool has a greater potential to grow in the upcoming years,
the asbestos plaintiff pool remains much larger.
355. Id. at 2.
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whereas silica is produced more by local or regional defendants. 356 Also,
many new defendants have been brought into silica litigation because, unlike
many veteran asbestos defendants, the silica defendants are solvent.357
Therefore, with new solvent defendants, silica litigation has the possibility to
grow. However, the nature of silica litigation, and the path it will take, is
unknown as of yet.358
The similarities between silicosis and asbestosis have caused some
attorneys to call silica the next asbestos. 359  However, despite the
commonalities, which sometimes cause the claims and their associated
diseases to be discussed together, there are so many differences between
silica and asbestos that it is questionable for attorneys to characterize silica
as the next asbestos for litigation purposes. 36
One difference between silica and asbestos is the types of diseases that
both products cause and their links to cancer. 361 The relationship between
asbestos and cancer is well-established. 362 Exposure to asbestos causes a
certain type of cancer called mesothelioma, whereas silica has not been
connected to a specific type of cancer.363 It still remains questionable
whether inhalation of silica dust is a direct cause of cancer.3 4 Many injured
persons have brought suit against asbestos manufacturers because it has been
proven that asbestos causes cancer. However, this same direct link has not
been made between silica and cancer, and thus it is unlikely that silica could
reach the litigation heights of asbestos.
Another difference between silica and asbestos litigation is the courts'
approaches to these types of claims. When the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Borel v. Fibreboard ruled that a manufacturer could be held
liable for injuries suffered by the ultimate user of asbestos, the floodgates of
litigation opened.365 With regard to silica litigation, many plaintiffs are
having difficulty holding silica manufacturers liable because courts are
recognizing affirmative defenses like the sophisticated user doctrine and the
bulk user doctrine.366 These doctrines place liability on the party that is best
356. Id.
357. Gilligan, Jr., supra note 42, at 19.
358. Id. at 19-20.
359. Id. at 19 (explaining that would-be silica litigation resembles asbestos litigation in that "the
respiratory injuries are similar, the claims are similar, the involved industries and trades are similar,
the medical, geological and industrial hygiene experts are similar, and the state of art is similar.").
360. Id. at 19-20.
361. Hughes, supra note 40, at 2.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See id.
365. Black, supra note 1.
366. See generally Goodbar v. Whitehead Bros., 591 F. Supp. 553 (W.D. Va. 1984); Bergfeld, v.
Unimin Corp. 319 F.3d 350 (8th Cir. 2003); Gray v. Badger Mining Corp., 664 N.W.2d 881 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2003).
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equipped to adequately provide a warning to the ultimate user. Asbestos
litigation has yet to see defensive measures like those that are being applied
in silica cases.3 6 7 Consequently, if this trend continues and if plaintiffs are
unable to recover from defendants with deeper pockets, then the silica
litigation is likely to slow down from its rapid pace.
"One of the biggest differences between asbestos and silica is that
personal injury cases involving exposure to silica may simply not lend
themselves to products liability cases in the way that personal injury
asbestos cases do. 368 In a basic silicosis claim, an employee is exposed to
silica dust when he is sandblasting or working in a mine. After some years,
he realizes that he has shortness of breath and a terrible cough. He goes to
see a doctor and the doctor gives him a chest x-ray. The chest x-ray shows
that this employee has mild silicosis. The doctor tells him that if he does not
stop working in this field, his silicosis will become acute and he will become
unable to breathe. The employee learns that he has contracted silicosis
because his employer has not informed him of the grave risks that working
with silica poses as well as not provided him with adequate protective gear.
The employee wants to be compensated for his injuries on the job and brings
suit against his employer. The employee quickly learns that he is only able
to bring a workers' compensation claim against his employer. The
employee receives the minimal recovery allocated by statute from workers'
compensation and is barely able to pay his medical expenses. His lawyer
suggests that he file a personal injury lawsuit against the employer's silica
supplier, like other plaintiffs in asbestos cases have done when they sued the
asbestos manufacturers. The employee cannot bring a defective design
claim, like the asbestosis claimant, because silica is a naturally occurring
mineral and therefore cannot be defectively designed.3 69 Instead, he brings a
failure to warn claim against the silica supplier. The supplier asserts the
sophisticated user doctrine which places liability on the employer who the
employee has already recovered from under workers' compensation.
This employee's situation is not uncommon. Among silica using
industries, an employer is the most likely entity to have created the
dangerous condition by not providing adequate warnings or protective
gear. 370 But workers are usually limited to bringing workers' compensation
claims against employers, as opposed to more lucrative products liability
suits against larger silica manufacturers and suppliers. 371  Because most
367. These types of defensive measures have not been applied in asbestos litigation. The bulk
supplier doctrine applies to raw materials and asbestos is not a raw material. The premise of the
bulk supplier doctrine is that no warning can be placed on raw materials delivered in bulk as they are
not packaged or labeled. Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 566. The sophisticated user doctrine applies
when'a supplier has reason to believe that the ultimate user knows of a product's dangerous
propensity. Id. at 561. These doctrines are thus inapplicable in cases where asbestos companies'
concealment of asbestos' dangerous propensities prevent the asbestos supplier from having reason to
believe that the user knew of its dangerous propensities.
368. Hughes, supra note 40, at 2.
369. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 5 cmt. c (1998).
370. Hughes, supra note 40, at 6.
371. Id. at 2.
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infected or injured employees are only likely to be able to bring workers'
compensation claims against their employers, the possible threat of
extensive litigation against their employers is minimal.372 Additionally, as
more courts across the country adopt the sophisticated user defense and
other similar measures that prevent manufacturers and suppliers from being
held liable, the possible threat of extensive litigation against silica
manufacturers and suppliers is also minimal.373 Only if courts were to adopt
the viewpoint that the silica that causes silicosis is not a naturally occurring
mineral because it is actually refined to a respirable form, making the silica
at issue a defectively designed product,374 then perhaps silica manufacturers
and suppliers could be held liable in products liability claims for defective
design. But courts confronted with silicosis cases do not seem to be leaning
in this direction.3 75 Therefore, without being able to hold deep-pocketed
defendants liable, silica litigation is unlikely to reach the magnitude of
asbestos litigation.
After examination and contemplation of the reasons for comparing silica
and asbestos, it becomes evident that silica litigation is unlikely to reach the
magnitude of asbestos litigation. The ways in which courts have approached
the silica cases are distinguishable from asbestos cases and is likely to
prevent silica litigation from spiraling out of control. This conclusion is
most dependent on how and if each jurisdiction decides to adopt the bulk
supplier doctrine or the sophisticated user doctrine.
While defense attorneys categorize silicosis as a waning problem,376
experts that have devoted their lives to the study of occupational disease see
silicosis as monumental of a problem now as it was almost a century ago.377
Without providing workers with the proper protection or refraining from
using silica completely, people will continue to develop silicosis. As long as
people are getting sick, litigation will continue. Although the litigation will
continue, the affirmative defenses that many courts have been adopting, like
the sophisticated user and the bulk supplier doctrine, will prevent many
silica manufacturers and suppliers from incurring liability and will most
likely act as controls to help prevent the litigation from becoming the
litigation nightmare that asbestos seems to be.
372. Id.
373. See, e.g., Gray, 664 N.W.2d at 887; Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 567.
374. Hughes, supra note 40, at 6 (quoting Gray v. Allied Mineral Prods., Inc., PI 99-66 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Aug. 28, 2002).
375. See, e.g., Gray, 664 N.W.2d at 887; Goodbar, 591 F. Supp. at 567.
376. See Lorber & Laird, supra note 82.
377. See DYING FOR WORK, supra note 347.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Whether silica is the next asbestos will not be truly known until this
resurgence of silica litigation plays itself out. Asbestos litigation and silica
litigation maintain their differences but for defense attorneys, some of the
patterns are all too similar. Although defense attorneys and their clients may
be seeing large amounts of lawsuits filed against them, companies' active
concealment of the knowledge that silica injures people causes little pity to
be felt for their legal troubles. Yet, Americans have seen many instances of
people abusing the justice system in order to make a quick buck, and as with
asbestos litigation, sometimes the rich employer, supplier, or manufacturer is
not the only party who suffers from these abuses. But as long as towns like
Picher still experience the devastation of silicosis, litigation will continue.
Hopefully, the increase in litigation will force the silica-using industry to
implement better, more effective safety measures or sustain from using silica
completely. Then, and only then, can silicosis truly be a "disease of the
past."
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